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In this paper, I contend that the standard interpretation of the Republic, according to which “the city of 
pigs” (CP) is an entirely deficient precursor to the one ideally just state, Kallipolis, is untenable. In the vital 
respect of unity, which for Plato is the defining condition of virtue in the soul and the city, CP is equally if 
not more just than Kallipolis. In part 1, I outline CP in terms of what I contend are the three organizing 
principles that secure its unity (“trade specialization”; “right size”; and “modesty”), before proceeding to 
defend this unity from some typical criticisms. The aim is to show that CP is unified and hence just, which 
allows us to make sense of why Socrates describes it as “complete” (telea), “true” (alêthinê), and “healthy” 
(hugiês), despite Glaucon’s protestations. To do so, I will have to first argue against objections from those 
who interpret CP as a suggestio falsi, or an exercise in playful irony, sketched only to establish the need for 
Kallipolis. In part 2, I then proceed to show that although Kallipolis is in certain respects superior to CP, it 
suffers from structural disunity relating to its heretofore unnoticed or downplayed geographical and social 
scissions—scissions that are requisite and unavoidable for its very organization. As such, Socrates tacitly 
suggests, I contend, that these scissions mark a disunity that results from reneging CP’s third organizing 
principle: the “modesty” principle. When Socrates, on his interlocutors’ demands, expands CP by allowing 
in items and conditions of luxury that provoke pleonexia (greed or covetousness) thus giving birth to the 
“feverish city,” he leads us to see the necessity of a kind of set-up in Kallipolis with a socially and 
geographically disparate class of guardians that is saturated by disunity. The overall argument of this paper 
is that Socrates takes us on a dialectical journey, leading us to see that unity and hence justice in each city 
depends upon each citizen doing her job and no more than her job (i.e., the principle of trade specialization) 
(433A-B). Both CP and Kallipolis are sketched for this heuristic purpose—to allow us to see this vision of 
justice. Socrates’ point in taking us on the dialectical journey, I contend, is to enable us to realize not just 
what justice is but what inhibits or threatens justice—namely, luxury, or more precisely wealth. CP is not 
a good model to allow us to see this, but this does not render it a suggestio falsi or an unrealistic false start. 
Indeed, on my reading, Socrates is not only serious when he dubs the city of pigs true and healthy, but we 
have to take these pronouncements seriously in order to properly accompany him on the journey and 
properly see his vision of political justice and injustice. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this paper, I contend that the standard interpretation of the Republic, according to which 
“the city of pigs” (hereafter CP) is an entirely deficient precursor to the one ideally just state, 
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Kallipolis, is untenable. In the vital respect of unity, which for Plato is the defining condition of 
virtue in the soul1 and the city,2 CP is equally if not more just than Kallipolis. In part 1, I outline 
CP in terms of what I contend are the three organizing principles that secure its unity (“trade 
specialization”; “right size”; and “modesty”), before proceeding to defend this unity from some 
typical criticisms. The aim is to show that CP is unified and hence just, which allows us to make 
sense of why Socrates describes it as “complete” (telea), “true” (alêthinê), and “healthy” (hugiês), 
despite Glaucon’s protestations. To do so, I will have to first argue against objections from those 
who interpret CP as a suggestio falsi, or an exercise in playful irony, sketched only to establish the 
need for Kallipolis. In part 2, I then proceed to show that although Kallipolis is in certain respects 
superior to CP, it suffers from structural disunity relating to its heretofore unnoticed or downplayed 
geographical and social scissions—scissions that are requisite and unavoidable for its very 
organization. As such, Socrates tacitly suggests, I contend, that these scissions mark a disunity that 
results from reneging CP’s third organizing principle: the “modesty” principle. When Socrates, on 
his interlocutors’ demands, expands CP by allowing in items and conditions of luxury that provoke 
pleonexia (greed or covetousness) thus giving birth to the “feverish city,” he leads us to see the 
necessity of a kind of set-up in Kallipolis with a socially and geographically disparate class of 
guardians that is saturated by disunity.  
 The overall argument of this paper, then, is that Socrates takes us on a dialectical journey, 
leading us to see that unity and hence justice in each city depends upon each citizen doing her job 
and no more than her job (i.e., the principle of trade specialization) (433A-B). Both cities are 
sketched for this heuristic purpose—to allow us to see this vision of justice. Yet, the point of 
undertaking this journey, for Socrates, is that we realize not just what the ultimate condition of 
justice is, but that we also see what inhibits or threatens justice: luxury, or more precisely wealth. 
The lack of luxury or wealth in CP is vital to its unity; the denial of luxury and wealth to the 
citizens of Kallipolis is vital to its unity. The problem with the latter, which makes it in this respect 
inferior to CP is that the set-up required in Kallipolis after the introduction of luxury or wealth 
involves a fundamental, structural disunity between its citizens—a disunity stemming from the 
1 Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, ed. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 443C–E; 
hereafter all in-text references are to this translation of the Republic unless otherwise indicated. 
2 “Is there any greater evil for a city,” asks Socrates, “than that which tears it apart and makes it many 
instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?” (462A–B). 
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class divisions that are necessary for preventing wealth from interfering with each citizen doing 
their job, and for preventing the city from being disunited as a result of external attack.  
 
1. The “City of Pigs” and its Problems 
 
 The “city of pigs” is the first example of a city created in logos, as a thought-experiment 
that Socrates and his interlocutors hypothesize in their quest to provide a large-scale model in 
which to locate justice in the human soul. The metaphysical question of what justice is in general—
the form of justice that is the same in a city as in a soul—is immediately blurred with the 
ontogenetic question of where justice comes from. As such, the question of what an ideally just 
city would look like is connected to the question of how such a city would come into being. 
Socrates posits that a city (or, rather a polis) is formed as a “response to human needs” (369B); CP 
is the first manifestation of an attempt to meet these needs. Catherine McKeen identifies two 
regulatory principles that structure CP:  
P1: Specialization: Citizens in CP practice just one trade each, and through this specialization labor is 
thereby divided according to what the citizens are “naturally suited” (370B–C). 
P2: Right Size: The city is small in terms of its population, consisting solely of tradesmen and their families. 
And the city is geographically small as not much land is needed for its small population of farmers, builders, 
weavers, cobblers, carpenters, metal workers, cowherds, shepherds and herdsmen (370D–E), “wage 
earners” selling their strength (371E), merchants (371A), and retailers to handle the community’s 
marketplace (371D). CP has a basic economy and is small in social terms.3 
 To McKeen’s two organizing principles a third should be added: 
P3: Modesty: The city caters for basic necessities. The citizens are described as living a happy but austere 
life with minimally comfortable furniture, adequate clothing for practical purposes, and basic food and 
drink (372A–B). The city is not organized to provide conditions or objects of luxury; it only includes 
citizens (and their families) whose trades cater for basic necessities. Excluded from CP are, for instance, 
artists, prostitutes, chefs to make fancy foods—in short, all the “non-necessary” tradespeople and their 
crafts that will later be introduced. 
3 Catherine McKeen, “Swillsburg City Limits (The ‘City of Pigs’: Republic 370c–372d),” Polis 21 (2004), 
p. 88. 
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 CP is organized around these three principles of trade-specialization, right size, and 
modesty. Now, it might be objected that P3 is not a separate principle but rather simply an 
entailment of P2. However, while P3 is clearly a correlate of P2—a small polis is likely to be one 
that is basic and modest—, P3 is not a logical entailment of P2, since it is perfectly possible to 
have a small polis which was nevertheless luxurious for at least a number of its citizens. McKeen 
is right to mention that the guiding motivation for the citizens coming together to form this city 
appears to be “rational self-interest” (McKeen 2004 85; see 369C); but it is important to specify 
that it is a modest, rational self-interest, which does not appear to demand luxury or 
aggrandizement. These principles order the city and provide for its unity: insofar as the citizens’ 
basic needs are met, and everyone has a role to play in maintaining the collective, CP attains a 
form of unity that Socrates suggests is stable and continuous: “And so, they’ll live in peace and 
good health, and when they die at a ripe old age, they’ll bequeath a similar life to their children” 
(372D). 
 Let me now turn to two important and oft-voiced objections leveled at CP qua city. Both 
seek to show inevitable disunity stemming from the putative inadequacy of the city’s basic 
organizing principles.  
 
1.1 The Problem of Self-Regulation 
 
 One can imagine all sorts of practical-political problems arising with CP as minimally 
characterized as it is. One of its glaring features is that it has no government or official body whose 
task is to govern the citizens and presumably guarantee the city’s law and order. Socrates’ inchoate 
outline apparently ignores problems such as: What would happen if there were too many people 
for one trade? Or, how would the city control the aspiring tyrant seeking to oppress the citizens? 
Socrates seems to simply default to a kind of natural regulation, wishfully or even naively 
assuming that the citizens would implicitly agree upon their needs through “rational self-interest.”  
 Before turning to elaborate exactly what the problem posed for CP’s unity is here, let me 
note a few things.  
 First, the Greek polis should not be taken to be straightforwardly akin to our modern 
concept of “city” or “state.” A polis was much more basically a community sharing a social and 
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geographical space.4 This is not to say that issues of law and order were somehow irrelevant. 
Rather, my point is that we should be careful not to assume that the modern bureaucratic state 
apparatus must set the standards for law and order in CP, or to immediately assume that a lack of 
official government already renders CP a non-polis proper. In connection, we shouldn’t ignore, for 
instance, the possibility that CP was supposed to represent something like what we would call a 
genuinely anarchistic polis regulated by non-hierarchical, non-bureaucratic, free associations. In 
fact, it is prima facie plausible that this is just how Socrates envisioned CP. He certainly didn’t 
think, for instance, that the lack of an official government meant disorder or chaos. This is 
intimated when he claims that its citizens wouldn’t have too many babies because they would be 
aware of their own limited resources (372B–C)—no need for a government to prescribe such a 
thing, he suggests; the citizens could collectively realize this for themselves and act accordingly.  
Second, and moreover, we should be careful not to turn this problem into one of under-
characterization. To highlight the indisputable under-characterization of CP is not in itself to 
highlight a serious constitutive problem with the city since it is not to criticize the basic organizing 
principles that characterize it (P1–P3). The real problem of self-regulation is not that Socrates 
simply didn’t consider many possible practical-political problems for CP, since he didn’t do so for 
Kallipolis either, as I will highlight. The real concern must be whether self-regulation is a sufficient 
theoretical answer to the threat to the city’s unity that these myriad practical-political problems 
pose. Moreover, did Socrates and/or Plato really think that the organizing principles of CP 
constitute it as a bona fide polis, or was the exercise of sketching CP really something else? 
 Plato commentators prefer to focus on the problem of regulation in relation to what Plato 
says about appetites. For instance, in his classic treatment, Reeve claims that a significant 
constitutive problem with CP’s unity is that CP supposedly contains “nothing to counteract the 
destabilizing effects of unnecessary appetites and the pleonexia to which they give rise.”5 His oft-
echoed argument is that on Plato’s psychological account of humans, we naturally have appetites 
that we yearn to fulfill, which left unchecked, lead to pleonexia (greed or covetousness). Without 
some kind of government, the argument goes, unity can’t be maintained because there is bound to 
4 See, for instance, David Melling, Understanding Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 75. 
5 C.D.C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), p. 171. 
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arise conflicts due to the competing pleonexias of the citizens. More specifically, Reeve contends, 
we all have “necessary” and “unnecessary” appetitive desires (as defined in book VIII, 558D–
559A). CP caters for citizens’ necessary appetitive desires (for food, shelter, etc.), but not for their 
unnecessary ones (that’s the whole point of P3). The problem is that unnecessary appetitive 
desires, for instance, for non-procreative sex, fine foods, extravagantly comfortable living 
conditions, are bound to exist in CP and would have to be kept in check somehow. The form of 
self-regulation described in CP is not sufficient to counter the destabilizing effects of these 
unnecessary appetitive desires. The claim then is that the citizens simply wouldn’t be able to abide 
by P3; and since there is no government to enforce modesty, conflict and hence disunity would 
result. Other notable scholars who have likewise argued that CP is in some sense unrealistic or 
impossible precisely because it has no form of government to control the citizens’ unnecessary 
desires include Cooper, Devereaux, and Annas.6 By contrast they say, in Kallipolis we see the 
antidote: the rule of a rational philosopher-king, helped by a guardian-warrior class of citizens who 
together govern the city and ward against the destructive effects of our inevitably destructive 
desires.  
 So, is the unity in CP inevitably undermined by a lack of government to control citizens’ 
appetites? On first blush, we should note that Socrates doesn’t describe the organization of CP as 
giving rise to pleonexia; indeed, it is striking that these citizens don’t appear greedy or out of 
control at all. It is only after luxurious items have been introduced to the city that pleonexia arises, 
due to the proliferation of unnecessary desires that coincides with this introduction. In other words, 
it is only after P2 has been sacrificed and the city expanded that pleonexia arises. But at this stage, 
we are dealing with a different city—the luxurious, feverish city (373B), not CP. The principle of 
modesty in CP is described as being matched by modesty in the citizens’ desires, in a way that 
seems to suggest that Reeve et al.’s criticism might be at least exegetically misled, if not necessarily 
philosophically. Both Smith7 and McKeen (2004, 71) have made compelling versions of this 
argument before.  
6 John Cooper, “Two Theories of Justice,” Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 74 (2000), pp. 5–27; 
Daniel T. Devereux, “Socrates’ First City in the Republic,” Apeiron 13:1 (1979), p. 37; and Julie Annas, 
An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 77.  
7 Nicholas D. Smith, “Plato’s Analogy of Soul and State,” The Journal of Ethics, 3 (1999), p. 41.  
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 In response, Reeve et al. might argue that although Plato doesn’t explicitly state, via 
Socrates or elsewise, that pleonexia would arise in CP, he indirectly suggests that it would do. The 
suggestion would be that CP can be retrospectively identified as unrealistic in virtue of what the 
rest of the Republic sets out. Barney makes this argument insightfully, so I will now expound her 
view.8 
 In Barney’s assessment, “[the city of pigs] embodies the hypothesis that a city without 
rational rule could be moderate in its appetites, and that hypothesis is false” (Barney 2002, 220). 
Human desires cannot ever possibly be moderate or modest, according to Barney’s Plato. Rather, 
there will always be “savage desires”—powerful and vicious, unnecessary appetitive desires—, 
which of their nature can’t be controlled; all we can do is try to limit their damage. Even a strenuous 
education cannot prevent these desires from arising in the first place (Barney 2002, 219). Since, 
according to Plato, all of us have these uncontrollable, unnecessary desires, the situation described 
in CP is either presupposing a false account of human life, or is not a serious suggestion in the first 
place. Barney suggests that both are true, concluding that, “the city is not a genuine possibility at 
all” (ibid). For Barney, the rest of the Republic shows that the kind of unity Plato envisioned 
necessarily requires a rational ruler, i.e. the philosopher-king who has acquired knowledge of the 
form of justice and thus knows how to govern the citizens justly and maintain unity to control these 
rambunctious desires. The self-regulating CP is thus dismissed by Barney as a suggestio falsi, and 
as an exercise in playful irony on Socrates’ part (2002, 221). Without the rational governance of 
the philosopher-king, Barney’s Plato wants us to see, the citizens’ savage desires would inevitably 
disrupt CP’s unity. CP, for Barney, simply serves to highlight through its impossible vision of self-
regulation of savage desires the necessity of Kallipolis where reason (the philosopher-king) with 
the help of spiritedness (the guardians), mitigate the effects of savage desires. This reading of the 
Republic, it should be noted, leans very heavily on a remark from Socrates’ during the discussion 
of dreams at the beginning of book IX, where he says to Glaucon: “Our dreams make it clear that 
there is a dangerous, wild and lawless form of desire in everyone, even in those of us who seem to 
be entirely moderate or measured” (572B). This is what leads Barney to claim that CP farcically 
8 See Rachel Barney, “Platonism, Moral Nostalgia, and the City of Pigs,” Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 17 (2002): 207–27. 
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suggests that austerity itself could inhibit these savage desires and thus prevent conflict. As she 
wryly puts it: “Nuts and berries are no substitute for the rule of reason” (Barney 2002, 220).  
 As clear and elegant as this argument is, let me immediately make a few minor points of 
caution before I continue to engage with it more directly. 
 First, in my view we should avoid dismissing Socrates’ apparently serious lauding of CP 
as “true” and “healthy” (372E) as ironic if we can. Irony is certainly an important Socratic device, 
but we should be careful not to allow it to function as a handy exegetical tool that allows us to 
dismiss any comments made by Socrates that don’t fit with our interpretations. If we can show 
why he might have meant his assessment sincerely, then to my mind that is more a textually 
responsible course. Second, we should also be careful about assessing CP by the standards of 
Kallipolis as this is potentially question begging. We cannot just assume, without clear textual 
evidence, that the Republic was intended to outline a kind of linear progression from a deficient 
city (CP) toward an absolute ideal (Kallipolis), or that even if Kallipolis is ultimately considered 
the superior polis, that it therefore must be superior in every way. And third, though we must agree 
with Barney that Plato in the Republic certainly claimed that most humans are in thrall to their 
appetites in general (see 588D; 428D), and moreover, that being controlled by one’s desires is not 
a good way to live (e.g. 586A–B), it’s less clear that he thought that we are all inevitably plagued 
by so-called “savage desires.” As Deslauriers points out, apart from the aforecited remark at 572B, 
there is no other place in the text where it is suggested that we are inevitably subject to such savage 
desires.9 Indeed, the set-up in Kallipolis precisely presupposes that at least some individuals—
namely, philosophers—can be liberated from savage desires if they exist and when they arise. As 
such, Barney’s claim about the inevitability of unity-destroying savage desires is perhaps too 
strong.  
 These points aside, the important question is, assuming that savage desires do arise, how 
are they to be dealt with? Let’s now analyze the details of Barney’s argument that Kallipolis 
represents the only ideal case of a polis that could manage these desires through the government 
of the rational philosopher-kings.  
 We should be careful to distinguish two conceptually separate components to Barney’s 
argument:  
9 Maguerite Deslauriers, “Stories of the Origins of Political Community and Savage Desires,” Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 17 (2002), p. 234. 
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A) A polis, on Plato’s account, must be governed by reason to ensure unity.  
B) Government by reason must come from an authority external to the citizens being ruled.  
 The first component is undeniable. At 435–442 Socrates clearly outlines how, of the three 
general parts of the soul (reason, spiritedness, and appetite), reason should rule over the lower part 
of the soul (appetite), with the help of spiritedness. Assuming the city-soul analogy, which Socrates 
invokes to found the discussion (368D– 369A), we can non-controversially infer that Socrates 
thought that reason should rule in a city. The second component of Barney’s argument (B), 
however, needs to be qualified. 
 Socrates recognized that rational rule can be imposed on an individual, and analogously on 
a city, either by himself/itself, or by someone or some faction external to that which is being 
governed. Yet, of these two options, he is explicit that it is preferable for the control to be internal. 
Consider 590D: “It is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself 
and his own, otherwise imposed from without” (my emphasis). Elsewhere, Socrates even suggests 
that being ruled by another is in some sense shameful: “Don’t you think it’s shameful and a great 
sign of vulgarity to be forced to make use of a justice imposed by others, as masters and judges, 
because you are unable to deal with the situation yourself?” (405A–B). Indeed, self-control is the 
lynchpin of unity in the individual soul, for Socrates (see 443D–E). The issue, of course, is that 
there are at least two alternative yet viable ways of understanding what this means for the vision 
of a just city. Most commentators identify Kallipolis as the ideal case of internal governance by 
reason: the philosopher-king and the guardians are citizens, after all, and are thus internal to the 
polis. An order “imposed from without” would indicate governance from non-citizens, perhaps a 
situation where the city was colonized. But surely another viable reading would point to a kind of 
anarchistic set-up where there is no distinction between the rulers and the ruled, no separate 
governing class. Indeed, Socrates could be read to be suggesting that a situation where a separate 
governing class was not necessary and citizens could control themselves would be most ideal. And 
isn’t this precisely what we’re shown with CP? In CP one faction of the city does not impose law 
and order upon another; it is somehow shared throughout. This, I hasten to add, isn’t to say that 
Kallipolis is not an ideal city. Rather, it is to suggest that CP might yet be one as well.  
 Most readers of the Republic, I imagine, would be inclined to respond that even granting 
that CP is rationally governed, it is not governed by the right kind of reason. The right kind of 
reason would be philosophical reason, as Socrates outlines in books IX and X. Although it is 
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interesting to note that the citizens of CP are much like Platonic philosophers insofar as they are 
seemingly not distracted by bodily desires, are not in rapture of money, are peaceful, and run their 
city as a response to modest needs (which, for Barney is, of course, good reason for thinking that 
CP is a suggestio falsi), it cannot be suggested that they have arrived at this way of life through 
reflection, deliberation, or perhaps even experience (of alternative options). The citizens are 
motivated by rational self-interest—along with history and tradition—, but not by philosophical 
reason. There is apparently no official education system in CP, which seemingly rules-out the 
possibility that the citizens could have fostered the kind of thoughtful self-awareness needed for 
the cultivation of virtues. While Socrates suggests that “a man could free himself [from 
unnecessary desires] by discipline from youth up” (559A), it is arguable that, for Plato, he could 
only do so through education—a system for which is lacking in CP. The citizens of CP live the 
kind of austere life that Socrates lauded as “healthy,” but not intentionally as a result of 
philosophical reflection or deliberation.  
 This is an important point. However, despite not being regulated by ideal philosophical 
reason, on my reading Socrates does take it that rational self-interest is enough to secure some 
form of unity in CP. This is evidenced not just by his previously cited remarks on it being “true,” 
“healthy,” and “complete,” but also later at 433A–B where he tacitly recurs to CP saying that 
justice ultimately stems from P1. The unity in CP might be considered fragile insofar as it depends 
upon the coherence of individuals’ self-interests, but provided it stays small and modest in terms 
of what it provides for its citizens, i.e. provided P2 and P3 hold, isn’t it plausible that the self-
interest of living in a small tightly knit community might outweigh any other potentially 
conflicting self-interests? Barney and others downplay the fact that rational self-interest can, and 
indeed does, provide at least some minimal self-regulation. As I pointed out earlier, the case of 
families limiting the number of children they have so as not to stretch resources is a case in point: 
the suggestion is that a social and rational self-interest to avoid resource poverty and conflict rules 
over an appetitive desire for sex and personal or familial gain (372C). And if this is the case, it 
seems plausible to think that they could control their desires for food, entertainment, and other 
such wants similarly. Lastly, it should be pointed out that as an empirical and historical matter of 
fact, there have been and continue to exist many communities that look quite similar to CP—
communities without the state apparatus of an organized or stratified governance—many of which 
have successfully maintained order and unity. Though some have followed Glaucon in deriding 
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such communities as “primitive” or “uncivilized,” as I will touch on in the next section, neither 
Plato nor Socrates does. Indeed, it’s hard not to see these judgments as straightforwardly 
prejudicial and even perhaps colonialist. 
 To be clear, my position is not that CP is perfectly unified, or that a de facto governing 
class of some sort is irrelevant. My argument is that this objection against CP has been significantly 
overstated. Moreover, I will argue in section 2 that the unity that Socrates identifies in CP in fact 
stems precisely from its lack of a separate echelon of governmental power. In fact, in Kallipolis, 
the introduction of this form of governance is what necessitates social segregation and disunity. 
The argument there will be that the set-up of Kallipolis, which promises more long-term stability 
because it is designed in anticipation of dealing with conflict through philosophical reason, 
nevertheless comes with heretofore-unnoticed disunity stemming from its separation of governors 
and those governed. The unity in CP is secured by its regulatory principles and the fact that the 
citizens share a common space and purpose. This unity is stable provided that the advantages of 
its simple community life and division of labor outweigh potentially conflicting personal interests 
for wealth or power. Keeping in mind the risk of turning against the community, plus the modesty 
and small size of CP, it seems fairly unlikely either that it would be invaded or that its citizens 
would turn against it. Of course, this unity—like the unity in any city—is fragile and finite.  
 The problem of self-regulation is essentially the problem of how CP could remain the right 
size without a separate government and maintain unity without this separate government. I have 
argued, however, that CP is precisely the case of a city run by reason that affords a strong, albeit 
finite, unity, contrary to claims by Barney and others. Now I will consider a second major criticism 
leveled at CP in virtue of its size—the problem of “full justice.” 
 
1.2. The Problem of Full Justice 
 
 The citizens of CP, as noted, are all either tradesmen or related family members. To be a 
citizen of CP one has to specialize in a trade that satisfies a basic need (P1)—the latter being 
identified collectively in accord with the citizens’ rational self-interest. But what would happen 
when someone born into the city is by nature a philosopher or a ruler? What role could they play 
in CP given that they are supposedly not suited to any of the trades that Socrates outlines? As 
Barney puts it: “some people are born to rule or to pursue wisdom, and there is no place for them 
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in the city of pigs” (Barney 2002, 220). This is problematic, suggests Barney, since if the city has 
no place for such people then if and when they are born into the city, they only have the option of 
performing a trade for which they are not suited if they are to remain citizens. Not only would this 
be “unnatural” in the sense both of going against the individual’s nature and the “natural” 
regulation of the city, it would also likely cause disruption and disunity for the city as a whole 
when someone is forced to do a job for which they are not born.  
 Here we are dealing with a constitutive problem relating mainly to P2—the size of CP. As 
Barney (2002, 223) highlights, it is clearly not sufficient to ignore this possibility: to fail to discuss 
this inevitability is to fail to discuss human life. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Plato doesn’t 
claim that every person is predestined for one job only; his claim is rather that each person would 
do a trade for which they are naturally suited (see 370C). At 374B–C, moreover, Socrates is clear 
that his point is that citizens should focus on just one trade, not that there is only trade for each 
citizen: they should, “work all [their lives] at a single trade for which [they have] a natural aptitude 
and keep away from all the others.” So, in the case of the person born to be a philosopher, it might 
turn out that although she would be best at being a philosopher, she might also be good at farming, 
for instance, or at least be strong enough to work the land, or if weak then canny enough to work 
as a merchant or trader. Plato’s point throughout the Republic is that citizens doing more than their 
one specific job is what causes disunity; disunity is not the result of citizens failing to find a job 
for which they are perfectly suited. At 433A, Socrates puts it like this: “justice is doing one’s own 
work and not meddling with what isn’t one’s own.” This is echoed at 443C where Socrates asserts: 
“Indeed, Glaucon, the principle that it is right for someone who is by nature a cobbler to practice 
cobblery and nothing else, for the carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for the others is a 
sort of image of justice—and that’s why it’s beneficial.”  
 Nevertheless, Barney might retort, in CP as opposed to Kallipolis, it is less likely that there 
will be a job suitable for every citizen, and thus less likely that the city will afford full justice to 
its citizens and be unified as such. CP’s smallness doesn’t allow for the diversity of human life, 
and particularly has no place for Socrates’ highest human, the philosopher. Although Barney 
doesn’t mention it, the problem of full justice is presumably a problem for anyone who isn’t 
naturally suited to one of the delimited available jobs in CP, and not just philosophers. In fact, if 
this is a problem that only applies to CP and not Kallipolis too we should consider the kind of 
available jobs in Kallipolis that are not available in CP. When CP is modified by Glaucon’s 
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demand for the introduction of luxury, Socrates shows that it is necessary to sacrifice P2 and 
expand the city to include all the tradesmen required to produce luxury. Particularly important in 
this regard are doctors, guardians, and artists. Now consider the question: Is there a problem of 
full justice if a citizen was born into CP naturally suited to one of these jobs? The answer in the 
case of artists must be no precisely because of the principle of modesty (P3): art, for Plato, appears 
to be a luxury (it is introduced as such at 372E-373) that contravenes the city’s modesty. 
Meanwhile, doctors and guardians are only necessary, Socrates implies, when the principle of 
modesty is sacrificed and luxury is allowed into the city—doctors to cope with the range of 
illnesses that will likely result from more indulgent lifestyles and diets, and warriors to protect the 
city’s burgeoning objects of luxury or wealth. As a result of the introduction of luxury, the city is 
completely transformed. As a modest and small polis, CP can’t provide full justice in the sense of 
ensuring a perfectly suitable job for everyone (surely Kallipolis cannot do this either), and in these 
cases CP’s government by rational self-interest to afford basic necessities does not allow for people 
who want to work to provide non-basic necessities or wants. But then we should ask: Why should 
CP have to ensure that all of its citizens are happy or fulfilled in this sense in any case? Barney’s 
criticism can’t be simply that CP doesn’t ensure that all of its citizens will be happy because it is 
clear that Socrates doesn’t think a city is successful in virtue of making all of its citizens happy: at 
420B he unambiguously says exactly that. Furthermore, in those cases where individuals are not 
suited to any of the jobs in CP and they don’t have a place in CP, presumably they are free to leave 
without necessarily disrupting CP’s unity. If, as Socrates argues, unity is maintained primarily 
insofar as people do a trade for which they are capable, and do not interfere with the trades of 
others, then it clearly does not depend upon each citizen having their dream job. As such, Barney’s 
criticism does not quite land. 
 Even though I think Barney’s criticism does not affect CP’s unity for the above reasons, 
she is surely right to be concerned that CP can’t have a position for philosophers. From the 
perspective of the rest of the Republic, it is undeniably problematic for Socrates that a city has no 
role for a philosopher: book IX clearly expounds how the philosopher is Plato’s summum bonum 
of human life. It must surely be a bad thing that CP has no formal education system—no 
academy—, as we have already mentioned, as this will mean that citizens (or, at least capable 
citizens) cannot advance their knowledge or foster their virtues. Given the historical stakes of 
Plato’s argument for the necessity of his academy to counter the putatively degenerative forces of 
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Homer and tragedy, this is not something that can be brushed aside. Although this limitation with 
CP does not undermine its unity, it does suggest a clear way in which CP is inferior to Kallipolis. 
It seems to be an unavoidable problem for CP since P3 is a concomitant of P2: if you have a small 
polis you necessarily have a small stock of options as to what citizens can do in this polis. This is 
a necessary drawback of CP at the heart of many commentators’ problems with CP: some call it 
“primitive” as a result (Cooper 2000, 13), others “uncivilized” (Melling 1987, 77). However, 
whilst P2 and its entailment P3 lead to a problem here, it is not one of unity. It certainly a way in 
which CP is inferior to Kallipolis—with the latter set up to include a rigorous education and 
improvement of the upper echelons of society—, Kallipolis is not more unified as a result of being 
thus more “civilized,” “advanced,” or “less primitive.” Indeed, the sacrifice of P2 and P3 that the 
set-up of Kallipolis is founded upon actually leads to a more serious problem of structural disunity 
in this supposedly ideal city, as I will now go on to argue.  
 
2. The Irony of Luxury and Kallipolis’ Structural Disunity 
 
 In considering the transition from CP to Kallipolis, we must think carefully about luxury. 
The introduction of luxury into CP transforms the city in virtue of apparently reneging two of its 
organizing principles: P2 (right size) and P3 (modesty). Luxury is introduced in many forms 
(372C–373C): from food, to furniture, to art in many forms and embroidery and fine clothes, to 
items such as incense and gold, to prostitutes. Importantly, the introduction of such luxury prompts 
the necessity of two kinds of citizen in addition to the relevant new tradesmen: doctors—due to 
the increased likelihood of bodily illness caused by luxurious lifestyles—, and an army—because 
of the prompted need for more land, and the increased likelihood of war and the external threat to 
said luxury. Glaucon’s demand for luxury—an expansion of the kinds of objects of wealth 
available to the citizens—necessitates the expansion of the city in both geographical terms (more 
land), and in social terms (more kinds of tradesmen). P2 is sacrificed along with the reneging of 
modesty (P3) and thus CP is no more. The most important introduction in this regard is the 
guardian warriors. 
 Although Kallipolis is premised on the reneging of P2 and P3, the principle that citizens 
should specialize in one trade only (P1) is not abandoned: Socrates successfully argues that the 
guardians would have to be a separate kind of tradesmen (374A–E), divided into rulers and 
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auxiliaries. Any unity and hence justice in Kallipolis is premised upon this division of labor. 
Subsequent discussion centers on the rigorous education of these guardians since they are the most 
dangerous citizens in virtue of their prerequisite strength, courage, and (after education) 
intelligence. If they are not properly educated and guided to protect the city then they could quite 
conceivably turn tyrannical, and seek to control the city and citizens for their own gain. As Socrates 
shows clearly, the guardians must be indoctrinated to love the city and its citizens above any 
idiosyncratic love or desire; cohering community interests must usurp their personal desires. As is 
well known, Socrates advocates the use of “noble lies” in the education of the guardians: myths 
they will be told as to their origin, role, and purpose in life (414D–415), as well as austere 
communal living conditions (416D–417). Socrates is outlining a holistic lifestyle and regimen 
designed to decrease the likelihood of licentiousness or pleonexia on the behalf of the guardians, 
since pleonexia in their case could have truly disastrous consequences for the whole city. Beyond 
the denial of private property, the guardians are forbidden anything that might trigger pleonexia. 
The communistic living arrangements that Socrates describes as necessary for the guardians are 
necessary to deter them from identifying anything as a private interest that could take pride of 
place over and above the citizens and the city itself. The worry is that if the guardians develop a 
personal set of interests that doesn’t correspond exactly with the community’s set of interests, then 
they might turn against the city in pursuit of their own gain.  
 On close inspection, guardians are denied precisely those luxurious things that were 
introduced into CP and that they were introduced to protect. Consider Socrates’ stipulations for 
the guardians. A healthy diet is essential: alcohol, sweet-meats, Attic pastry are all out (403D–
405B); excess of food is forbidden (416D–417B). The guardians are denied personal wages, 
private living space or house, ornaments, and any private land (416D–417B). Art that is indulgent 
or that isn’t strictly designed for patriotic purposes is likewise outlawed (395B). We can also add 
furnishings, and gold and silver, to the list of guardian contraband (419). Further, guardians are 
denied the privilege of entertaining guests (419), the freedom to make presents for mistresses, or 
to spend money on other desires (420A). Indeed, as Adeimantus puts it: they are denied anything 
that typically makes people “happy” (419). In response to Adeimantus’ complaint, Socrates simply 
agrees and responds that their goal was not to make everyone happy, but to “mold the model of a 
happy state” (420C). It should come as no surprise to Socrates’ interlocutors that he rebuffs the 
call to cater for citizens’ happiness, since he took CP to be an illustration of a just city in his terms 
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despite acknowledging that its arrangement wouldn’t satisfy “some people” (373A). What should 
surprise Adeimantus et al. is that virtually every luxurious thing that was explicitly introduced into 
CP is denied to this guardian class. The obvious reason why Socrates forbids the guardians from 
such pleasures and privileges is because he thinks they would encourage or incite them to indulge 
their desires in a way that might prompt problems for the city’s order and unity. 
 What actually changes from CP to the luxurious (“feverish”) city and from the luxurious 
city to Kallipolis is not people’s mentality—as if suddenly citizens were being fully characterized 
in psychological terms, whereas previously Socrates had been working with some radically 
falsified version of human psychology. Rather, more fundamentally and obviously, what changes 
are the things available to the citizens. It is the introduction of luxury that turns the city and the 
citizens “feverish”; it is the “purging” of luxury that restores unity. Before the introduction of 
objects of wealth there are no objects of desire to trigger feverish pleonexia. On my reading, a vital 
part of what the guardians are denied is luxury, in an attempt to prevent their being feverish 
themselves. And here we begin to see the irony of luxury in the Republic. Glaucon demands the 
introduction of luxurious things, a demand to which Socrates acquiesces. Immediately, however, 
Socrates commences upon a drawn-out quest to purge the city of this luxury by showing that the 
conditions that luxury induces necessitate its own purging—something that he leads his 
interlocutors to recognize. Socrates puts it like this: “And, by the dog, without being aware of it, 
we’ve been purifying the city we recently said was luxurious”—a purification that he continues to 
outline (399E). The guardians must live in austere conditions to prevent the acquisitive part of 
their soul from going wild and thus endangering the city and the rest of the citizens; they are denied 
objects of luxury to inhibit their potential pleonexia. The irony is that the guardians are introduced 
to defend the city’s luxury, but their dangerous presence is precisely what necessitates the purging 
of this luxury.  
 At this point, one might wonder whether Socrates meant that Kallipolis should contain no 
luxurious things at all or just that the guardians specifically should be denied them. Might some of 
Kallipolis’ other citizens be granted indulgence in fine foods, comfortable furnishings, fancy 
clothes, extravagant art? Not much further on Socrates gives us the answer: 
We know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work 
the land whenever they please. We know how to settle our potters on couches by the fire, feasting and 
passing the wine around, with their wheel beside them for whenever they want to make pots. And we can 
make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. Don’t urge me to do this, 
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however, for if we do, a farmer wouldn’t be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the others would 
keep to the patterns of work that give rise to the city. (420D–421A) 
 In this passage, objects of luxury are directly connected to laziness and to citizens not doing 
their jobs; thus they are prohibited. Producers, Socrates contends, shouldn’t be allowed to fall into 
poverty, but yet they shouldn’t be granted wealth or objects of wealth since wealth “makes for 
luxury, idleness, and revolution” (422A). The guardians indeed are supposed to “guard against” 
both poverty and wealth from “slipping into the city unnoticed” (421E). Socrates continues to 
stipulate that none of the citizens of Kallipolis would want gold—the supreme object of wealth—
and even further, and remarkably, that to possess gold would be illegal (422D). Neither Kallipolis’ 
guardians nor its producers are granted the wealth prerequisite for luxury out of fear that it would 
corrupt or otherwise prevent them from doing their job; meanwhile the philosopher-king is 
described as being exactly the kind of person who would have no interest in any such things.  
So, what has happened to all of the luxurious items that were added to CP? What has 
happened to the robes, the gold, the couches, the feasts, the pastries (not to mention the 
prostitutes)? All three classes of citizens are forbidden or uninterested in possession of these 
luxurious objects. Having purged luxury, doesn’t Socrates thereby retrospectively eliminate the 
necessity for most of the enlargements to CP that were precisely prompted by luxury in the first 
place? If Kallipolis’ citizens are all denied extravagant foods and lifestyles, then why the need for 
more doctors? If the citizens are forbidden fancy art, clothes, furnishings and the like, what need 
does the city have for producers of these things? Most importantly, without any items of wealth or 
luxurious living conditions, what need is there for the guardians? After all, if there are no lavishly 
festooned houses, fancy foods—indeed no wealth, gold, or luxury at all—then there is nothing to 
provoke rambunctious desires in people outside the city, and nothing which needs to be protected 
from external attack. Haven’t the guardians become superfluous precisely in virtue of the living 
conditions that the guardians need? Hasn’t Socrates silently and tacitly reinstated both P2 and P3 
thereby leading us in a circle back to something like CP? 
 For standard readers of the relation between CP and Kallipolis, whom we encountered in 
section 1, what Plato has shown us in the discussion up to this point is that pleonexia would arise 
both in CP and in Kallipolis. The important difference is that in the latter unlike the former we 
have a reasonably detailed outline of both the education that citizens, or rather some of the citizens, 
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would receive, as well as a system of governance—both of which are designed to guard and train 
against pleonexia as well as, of course, to foster virtues more broadly.  
 However, for guardians to live alongside a separate class of citizens who are allowed to 
indulge in the fineries of luxury that were added to CP without this triggering the desiring part of 
the guardians’ souls seems implausible. The differences between the already disparate lifestyles 
of producers and guardians would be heightened if the former were allowed luxuries whilst the 
latter had to live alongside them and were forbidden from indulging in any form of luxury. Would 
it make sense for guardians and producers to share the same social space? Socrates clearly didn’t 
think so. Indeed, he tells us that guardians will have to have a separate geographical space from 
the producers to match their separate lifestyle: 
And let’s now arm our earthborn and lead them forth with their rulers in charge. And as they march, let 
them look for the best place in the city to have their camp, a site from which they can most easily control 
those within, if anyone is unwilling to obey the laws, or repel any outside enemy who comes like a wolf 
upon the flock. (415D–E) 
 Now, what is the upshot of this for the central question of unity? Socrates implies that 
giving up on CP’s modesty (P3) in terms of the things available to citizens leads to a reneging of 
modesty in the citizens’ attitudes as well. The citizens become “feverish” when they are allowed 
or encouraged to indulge in things; with luxurious things come superfluous desires, which leads to 
conflict and disunity. To guard against this feverishness and the disunity that will likely result, 
Kallipolis is organized into three classes with the guardian class trained to maintain unity. But now 
here an obvious disunity becomes apparent. How can there be unity between the guardians and the 
rest of the citizens when the guardians essentially live a different life in a different city?10 Socrates 
is so keen to ensure that the guardians are not exposed to corruption-inspiring living conditions or 
desirable objects that he separates them off entirely and outlines an entirely different way of life 
for them. Guardians do not share the same social space or engage in the same practices as 
producers. Their introduction, rather than uniting the city, splits it into two. The citizens of CP are 
unified by a common geographical and social space, and by a common cause: the basic necessities 
10 Cinzia Arruzza has discussed the tension in the Republic between the private and the common, including 
the geographical/spatial tension created by the living arrangements for the guardians in contrast to those for 
the producers in her article “The Private and the Common in Plato’s Republic,” History of Political Thought 
32:2 (2011), pp. 215–33.  
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of the citizens. The citizens in Kallipolis are split up socially, geographically, and have completely 
disparate causes: the producers must provide for the city’s basic needs, the guardians must train 
and be educated to protect the city. Later in book VIII, Socrates criticizes the oligarchic state 
precisely in virtue of its scission: “It isn’t one city but two—one of the poor and one of the rich—
living in the same place and always plotting against each other” (551D). But, Socrates and his 
interlocutors apparently haven’t noticed that Kallipolis is similarly split: it is not divided by 
wealth, but more basically by its classes’ disparate ways of life—their organization and 
arrangement. The unity that Kallipolis maintains is that which is provided by myth and propaganda 
designed to instill a kind of patriotic love of the city and a distant fraternity with their fellow 
citizens. But the unity supposedly afforded by myth is not only precarious, it also clearly cannot 
overcome the spatial and social distance between the guardians and the other citizens. How and in 
what sense can it be considered stronger than the unity afforded by shared space and common 
purpose? 
 So, now we come full circle to CP. And the following question becomes apropos: If 
luxury—understood in terms of objects of wealth—and the desire for it that it inspires are the root 
cause of disunity, then why doesn’t Socrates reject Glaucon’s demand for its introduction into CP 
in the first place? Isn’t his acquiescence to Glaucon an implicit indication that there is something 
seriously lacking in CP? The answer to the first question, I believe, is also the answer to the second, 
as I will now argue before concluding. 
 The main reason that Socrates doesn’t reject Glaucon’s demand for the introduction of 
luxury is what we might call a heuristic reason—a reason not to do with CP qua city, but qua 
explanatory model. What Socrates actually says when prompted to discuss a luxurious city is this: 
“Perhaps this isn’t such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we 
could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states” (372E). In other words, Socrates doesn’t 
accept Glaucon’s demand because he thinks CP is deficient for not having luxury, but rather 
because he thinks it will be heuristically useful to introduce luxury as this will help to illustrate 
how disunity might arise. Socrates expressly denies that there is anything wrong with CP. Indeed, 
later in the text he retrospectively affirms that CP is just. It is ultimately trade specialization (P1) 
that ensures unity and justice in both CP and Kallipolis, he writes: 
Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it—
either that or some form of it. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must practice 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.12, n.1. p. 1-22, 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v12i2p1-22 
19
one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited…Then, it turns out that this doing 
one’s own work—provided that it comes to be in a certain way—is justice. (433A–B; emphasis added) 
 Socrates reiterates this point shortly thereafter: “Then, the dream we had has been 
completely fulfilled—our suspicion that, with the help of some god, we had hit upon the origin 
and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city” (433A–B; emphasis added). The 
implication is that injustice arises in CP in the same way in which it arises in Kallipolis namely, 
through citizens either meddling with a job that is not theirs, or simply not doing their job at all. A 
more plausible account of why Socrates leaves CP behind is that, whilst there is justice (and 
potential injustice) in this city, it’s nevertheless difficult to identify it because it is not being 
brought into stark relief by the presence of conflict- and injustice-inspiring objects of wealth. 
Hence, the very absence of luxury in CP is what is responsible for this heuristic problem: there 
simply doesn’t appear to be anything provided for the citizens by CP that would cause pleonexia 
to run amok and thus provoke disunity. Socrates’ acquiescence is for the purpose of the discussion 
of justice, not because he agrees with Glaucon that luxury is necessary or unavoidable. Indeed, 
clearly Socrates couldn’t have thought that luxury was an historical or practical necessity since 
then he would undermine the very possibility of the austere living conditions that he prescribes for 
the guardians, and thus the very possibility of Kallipolis! And as such, the introduction of luxury 
and the transition from CP to Kallipolis cannot be legitimately interpreted as a straightforward 
linear progression toward an ideal state: as if we were getting closer and closer approximations to 
the form of justice. Instead, I contend, Socrates dialectically shows us that the introduction of 
luxury has disastrous effects and needs to be purged from any ideal city by showing us how luxury 
triggers pleonexia which causes disunity. Socrates reveals to us what he thinks justice and injustice 
are via the introduction of luxury.  
 My point then is that we can accept that there is nothing constitutively wrong with CP in 
terms of unity, and in terms of being a just organization of citizens and yet still acknowledge that 
it is unilluminating for the heuristic purpose of trying to identify justice and injustice. Notice, in 
other words, that this objection is not tantamount to saying that there is something deeply wrong 
with the city of pigs in terms of its unity. As Smith (1999: 43) points out, “An image may be poorly 
suited for an inquiry into the nature of that which the image imitates, for reasons other than that it 
is a poor image.” Of course, it would hence be much better if we could all come to renounce luxury, 
and in general the pursuit of “good” things, and instead seek to contemplate goodness itself. In 
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other words, as Plato clearly suggests in books IX and X, it would be better if we were 
philosophers. But if per impossibile, we all reach Platonic philosophical enlightenment, then the 
set-up in Kallipolis of stratified class control becomes superfluous; CP would be sufficient for us. 
We could live a happy, austere life free from war and the danger of a guardian class turning 
tyrannical. However, it is precisely the modesty and smallness of CP that preclude it from being a 
city in which we could become educated and philosophical in the first place because it only caters 
for basic bodily needs and no spiritual or intellectual ones. As such, CP is inferior to Kallipolis 
because it doesn’t have the means to ensure that its citizens progress beyond rational self-interest; 
but Kallipolis is inferior to CP because although it secures the means for this progression, the 
organization of its citizens involves inherent division and disunity, and a purging of everything 
that was supposed to make it distinct from CP in the first place. What emerges from this dialectical 
journey is not one beautiful city but two, deeply connected images of the same concept: justice. 
To reject CP as a “false start,” as has become orthodox in Plato scholarship, is to refuse to be 
guided by Socrates and ultimately a failure to see what he wants to make apparent to us.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 My aim in this paper has been to challenge the traditional reading of the city of pigs as an 
unrealistic false start or deficient precursor to the outline of the one ideal state, Kallipolis. I 
assessed some typical criticisms leveled at CP and sought to show that they don’t amount to a 
serious constitutive problem of unity in CP. I sought to illustrate that CP is in fact an ideal city 
according to Plato’s own criterion of unity. In part two of this paper I offered an interpretation of 
the shift from CP to Kallipolis that sought to undermine the hegemonic view that this shift is one 
of a linear progression from a deficient model to a city-state paragon. In terms of unity, I claimed 
the exact opposite: the progression is in fact from highly unified to structurally disunited. This, I 
argued, is due to the introduction of luxury and the abandonment of P2 and P3 and its disastrous 
consequences. 
 CP is an integral part of Plato’s discussion of justice. It is ultimately “left behind” only for 
the heuristic reason that it is not a good model in which to identify justice qua unity, not because 
it is not in fact a viable model for a just state. The unity in CP is due to its organizing principles, 
and the heretofore downplayed or ignored disunity in Kallipolis, I have shown, stems from its 
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reneging of two of these principles. But this is not to claim that Kallipolis is ipso facto inferior to 
CP or that CP is perfect. Indeed, in at least one important respect, Kallipolis is more ideal than CP 
insofar as it has a place for philosophers. My main goal here, however, has been to disrupt the 
orthodox reading of the journey from CP to Kallipolis, which I have argued is over-simplistic and 
ultimately unjustified. Rehabilitating the city of pigs is necessary if we are to properly appreciate 
Plato’s account of justice.  
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